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NOTE
WINNING THE BATTLE OR LOSING THE WAR?: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF BOSEMAN V. JARRELL ON
THE SAME-SEX ADOPTION DEBATE
IN NORTH CAROLINA
JACINTA JONES*

ABSTRACT

The issue of gay adoption in North Carolina has been discussed and
debated for many decades. Like its marital counterpart, this controversy has been both supported and condemned on moral, religious
and social backgrounds. Although gay adoption has not been legalized by North Carolina in statutory or case law, the Supreme Court
recently handed down a decision that appears to afford gay couples
the same rights to legal and physical custody as their heterosexual
peers. In Boseman v. Jarrell, the North Carolina Supreme Court
awarded custody of a child to a non-biological same-sex parent by
holding that the biological parent engaged in behavior that conflicted
with her constitutional right to parent. Although this decision appears
to be a large victory in the battle for recognition of gay adoption
within the state, the decision in Boseman has actually dealt a huge
blow to the argument for its relevancy. I suggest that the Supreme
Court's reliance on case law directed to unmarried, heterosexual
couples to support the decision in Boseman erroneously creates a parallel between the opportunities available for both homosexual and
heterosexual couples. Because marriage is virtually available to every
straight couple but inaccessible for gay couples, the similarity drawn
here loses its functionality. Non-biological parents of children deliberately born into homosexual relationships can never receive full recognition as parents and will be relegated to the same third-party custody
analysis as grandparents, without having a legally-recognized constitutional right to parent.
* B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Sociology and African American
Studies, 2009; J.D. (cand.), North Carolina Central University School of Law, 2012. I would like
to thank my parents, Elvis and Cathy Jones, for all of their love and support throughout my law
school experience. "I will bless the Lord at ALL times; his praises shall continually be in my
mouth." Psalm 34:1
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INTRODUCTION

Same-sex marriage adoption is a hot-button topic in the United
States today. Although this issue is being discussed on a national platform, a majority of state legislatures are currently in the process of
determining whether same-sex adoption should become a part of their
legal processes. In conservative states such as North Carolina, the
fight to allow same-sex adoption has been an uphill battle. Many
same-sex couples have struggled with ways to create a joint co-parenting system when only one partner is a biological parent to the child.
This problem raises several constitutional issues to consider when discussing same-sex adoption.
The North Carolina Supreme Court attempted to resolve some of
these issues in Boseman v. Jarrell.' In this case, the Supreme Court
chose not to recognize a legal adoptive relationship between a child
and the former same-sex partner of the child's biological mother because the adoption did not comply with North Carolina's statutory
requirements.2 However, the Court in Boseman affirmed the custody
award under a normal "best interest of the child" analysis.3 The decision in this case provides only three options for biological parents involved in same-sex relationships: 1) the biological parent must deprive
their former partner of the opportunity to legally be recognized as a
parent to the child that the couple has jointly raised; 2) the biological
parent must terminate their parental rights; or 3) or the biological parent must engage in behavior that is deemed to conflict with their constitutional right to parent.4 Either way, one of the parents must
forego the rights and entitlements that the United States Constitution
provides to natural parents.
This case note will explore the structure of North Carolina's laws on
adoption and the way that those laws may affect a same-sex couple's
decision to start a family. This note will also evaluate the holding of
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Boseman as well as the case law
that the Court relied on in reaching its decision. Finally, the note will
explain that although Boseman helps to create a remedy for custody
disputes amongst same-sex couples, it creates several issues that severely handicap the movement for legislation on same-sex adoption in
North Carolina.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 494.
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THE CASE

Boseman arises out of a custody dispute between a biological
mother and her former same-sex partner.' The plaintiff, Julia
Boseman, and the defendant, Melissa Jarrell, began their relationship
in the spring of 1999 in Wilmington, North Carolina.6 The following
year, the couple discussed having a child and they jointly decided that
Jarrell would be the one to bear the child.' Subsequently, Jarrell conceived a son via artificial insemination from an anonymous sperm donor and the child was born in October of 2002.8 The parties jointly
raised the child and held themselves out to the public as his parents.9
The parties also gave the child a hyphenated last name consisting of
both of their last names.'o The parents equally participated in the
childrearing process and were both described as "hands-on" in their
parenting approaches." The child called one party "Mom" and the
other "Mommy."' 2 Each party testified that "the other is and has
been a good parent."' 3
The parties later decided to try and enter an adoption decree for
Boseman that would make her a legal parent of the child.' 4 In 2005,
Boseman informed Jarrell that she had "found a way" to adopt the
child in Durham County, North Carolina." In June of 2005, the parties petitioned the Durham County District Court to make Boseman
an adoptive parent without terminating Jarrell's relationship as the biological mother.' 6 In the adoption petition, the parties asked the
court not to comply with the requirements of two North Carolina
adoption statutes: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-606(9) and N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 48-1-106(c).'" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-609(c) provides, in pertinent
part, "every aspect of the legal relationship between the adoptee and
the former parent or guardian will be terminated." 8 N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 48-1-106(c) provides, in pertinent part, "a decree of adoption severs
the relationship of parent and child between the individual adopted
and that individual's biological or previous parents."" Jarrell's con5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.C. GIN. SAIr. § 48-3-606(9) (2010).
N.C. GIN. SlAr. § 48-1-106(c) (2010).
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sent to Boseman's adoption was contingent upon the court's agreement not to enforce the two aforementioned statutory requirements. 20
The Durham County adoption court agreed to the couple's terms and
entered an adoption decree on August 10, 2005.21
The parties separated in May of 2006 and Boseman continued to
financially provide for the child.2 2 Jarrell began to limit the child's
contact with Boseman after the separation and Boseman filed a complaint in the trial court seeking custody of the child, relying partly on
the 2005 adoption decree. 23 Jarrell attacked the validity of the adoption decree in her response arguing that the plaintiff had no grounds
to seek custody of the child.2 4 Without addressing the validity of the
adoption decree, the trial court held that Jarrell acted "inconsistent
with her paramount parental rights and responsibilities" and that joint
legal custody between the parties would be in the best interest of the
child.25
Jarrell appealed the decision to the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. 26 The Court of
Appeals held that the challenged adoption decree comported with the
"intent and purposes" of both North Carolina adoption law as a whole
as well as of the decree itself.27 Upon discretionary review, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that since the decree failed to comply
with the statutory requirements, the adoption decree was void ab initio.2 8 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the joint custody award, stating
that the Court of Appeals correctly applied a "best interest of the
child" analysis since Jarrell "acted inconsistently with her paramount
parental status." 2 9

III.

BACKGROUND

Boseman created one of the first legally recognized methods of recourse for same-sex couples with children in North Carolina. Prior to
the decision in Boseman, third parties were only able to receive or
share custody of children with their biological parents under a "best
interests" analysis. 3 0 Hence, the laws regarding adoption, parenting
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 497.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Boseman v. Jarrell, 681 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)).
Id. at 498 (citing Boseman, 681 S.E.2d at 381).
Id.
Id.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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and custody in North Carolina have been geared only toward the
traditional idea of a family unit.
The North Carolina legislature has created three types of adoptions
for minor children: direct placement, agency placement and stepparent adoption.3 ' Although the three types vary, they all require an initial termination of parental rights before the adoption can become
valid. 32 The first type of adoption recognized in North Carolina is a
direct placement adoption. In a direct placement adoption, a child's
parent or guardian "personally selects" the adoptive parent(s) 33 and
must give their consent to the adoption.3 4 A direct placement adoption requires a biological parent or guardian to voluntarily relinquish
their parental rights to a third party that they have selected." When
consenting to a direct placement adoption, the parent or guardian
must recognize that the adoption will "terminate the child's legal relationship with the parent."3 6 Further, statutory law requires that a direct placement adoption decree only be entered if it "effects a
complete substitution of families" for the minor child." The proposed
adoption in Boseman is most similar to a direct placement because of
Jarrell's voluntary willingness to treat Boseman as a second, adoptive
parent of the child.
The second type of adoption is an agency placement adoption. In
an agency placement adoption, an agency may take physical custody
of a child and begin an adoption process "only by means of a relinquishment pursuant to [N.C.G.S. §§ 48-3-701 to 48-3-707] or by a
court order terminating the rights and duties of a parent or guardian
of the minor."" Lastly, the third and final type of adoption recognized in North Carolina is a stepparent adoption. In a stepparent
adoption, a minor is adopted by the spouse of the minor's parent.
The spouse of the parent who is seeking to adopt the child must not
already be a legal parent of the child"o and the child's legal parents or
guardians must consent to the adoption in order for it to take place. 4'
Stepparent adoptions are only available to married couples, so this
type of adoption was not available in Boseman.
31. Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 499.
32. See Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 493 (citing N.C. GIEN. STAr. §§ 48-3-606(9), 48-3-203(a), 484-102 (2010) (requiring a termination of parental rights for biological parent before adoption
may take place)).
33. Bosenan, 704 S.E.2d at 493 (citing N.C. GIN. STAr. § 48-3-202(a)).
34. Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 493 (citing N.C. GIN. STA r. § 48-3-201(b) (2010)).
35. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 48-3-606(9).
36. Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 493. (citing § 48-3-606(9)).
37. N.C. GIN. S-twr. § 48-1-106(a) (2010).
38. Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 493 (citing N.C. GIN. STAr. § 48-3-203(a) (2010)).
39. N.C. GIEN. STAr. § 48-4-102 (2010)
40. N.C. GiEN. STAT. § 48-1-101(18) (2010).
41. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 48-4-102 (2010).
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Although adoption involves creating a legal parent-child relationship that provides the same rights and duties as those given to a biological parent,4 2 a petition for custody does not. When a third party
petitions for custody of a child, the third party is not immediately entitled to all of the rights and duties of a parent. 4 3 Because the relationship between a biological or adoptive parent is constitutionally
protected, 4 4 the interests of a parent involving the well-being of a minor child must prevail over a third party's interests "unless the court
finds that the parents are unfit or have neglected the welfare of their
children." 4 5 North Carolina law also requires that all custody decisions be based upon a "best interest of the child" standard regardless
of the status of the person seeking custody.4 6
When parents involved in third-party custody disputes challenged
the constitutionality of this statutory requirement, the North Carolina
Supreme Court created a second method by which a third party could
challenge a biological parent's constitutional right to care for a child.4 7
The Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that a parent may
lose their right to a paramount status in the rearing of their children if
they engage in conduct that is inconsistent with the presumption that
they will act in the best interest of their child or if the parent "fails to
shoulder the responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a child."',
The court held that a parent must not initially be deemed unfit before
a "best interest" standard may be applied because the "conduct inconsistent with the parent's protected status" does not have to rise to the
level meeting the statutory requirement for a termination of parental
rights.4 9 Instead, other types of conduct may show inconsistency on a
case-by-case basis.s0
1 In Price, the court addressed
One such case is Price v. Howard."
the issue of a third party's right to custody of a child under a "best
interests of the child" analysis when the biological parent has neither
terminated their parental rights nor been declared unfit by the
courts.5 2 In Price, the minor child's mother began a relationship with
42. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 48-1-106(b) (2010).

43. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
44. Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 531 (N.C. 1997) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978) (holding that the rights of biological parents over the rearing of their children are
constitutionally protected)).
45. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
46. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 50-13.2(a) (2010).
47. Price, 484 S.E.2d at 535.
48. Id.
49. Id. (see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (repealed 1999)).
50. Price, 484 S.E.2d at 534-35.
51. Id. at 528.
52. Id.
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the plaintiff who was not her child's father. The couple held the
plaintiff out to be the father of the child from birth and the plaintiff
had primary physical custody of the child for several years after the
couple's separation. 54 During the custody dispute, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the defendant acted inconsistently with her
paramount right to parent because she "created the existing family
unit that includes the plaintiff and the child, but not herself." 5
"Knowing that the child was her natural child, but not plaintiff's, she
represented to the child and to others that plaintiff was the child's
natural father." 56 The Court reversed the appellate court's decision
and remanded the case for a determination of whether the defendant's conduct was inconsistent with her paramount right to parent.5 7
The North Carolina Court of Appeals revisited the issue regarding
conduct inconsistent with the paramount right to parent in Mason v.
Dwinnell." In Mason, the court evaluated a custody dispute between
a same-sex couple who entered into a "parenting agreement" regarding the joint childrearing duties after their decision to have a child.5 9
The Court of Appeals used the parenting agreement not as a legally
binding document, but as "a manifestation of Dwinnell's [defendant's]
intent to create a permanent family unit involving two parents and a
child that would continue even if the relationship between Dwinnell
and Mason [plaintiff] did not."o In its decision, the Court of Appeals
explained that when a legal parent of a child decides to bring a third
party into their child's life, mainly with the intention to provide that
child with a second parent, the legal parent's right to destroy the relationship between the child and the third party is understandably

reduced. 6 1
The Court further explained that although the defendant could no
longer automatically modify the relationship between the child and
the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not automatically entitled to the same
rights and duties as a legal parent. 62 The decision merely meant that
the court could apply a "best interest" analysis in determining custody
53. Id. at 529.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 537.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 68.
61. Id. at 69 (citing Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 169 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("When
a legal parent invites a third party into a child's life, and that invitation alters a child's life by
essentially providing him with another parent, the legal parent's rights to unilaterally sever that
relationship are necessarily reduced.")).
62. Id. at 68.
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and visitation." Finally, the Court of Appeals held "[c]ourts do not
violate a parent's constitutionally protected interest by respecting the
parent-child relationships that the legal parent - in accordance with
her constitutional rights - voluntarily chose to create."'
Despite the fact that Mason dealt with a same-sex partnership, the
Court of Appeals treated the legal analysis for the same-sex couple in
the same manner as the heterosexual couple received in Price. The
Court stated that the couple's same-sex status was "immaterial" to the
court's determination6 5 and that the case dealt only with constitutional
issues as they applied to "all custody disputes between legal parents
and third parties." 66
The standards applied in Price, Mason, and Boseman have several
consequences for the same-sex adoption debate. First, the standards
in these cases create a small victory for same-sex couples by creating
an avenue for members of same-sex couples to equally be recognized
as the parents of their children in some aspects. In addition, Boseman
and its predecessors handicap the argument for same-sex adoption by
providing an outlet for the recognition of same-sex couples as equal
parents without requiring the North Carolina legislature or courts to
create same-sex adoption within the state.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Although the decision in Boseman wins a small battle in recognizing
the rights of third parties to seek custody of children born into samesex relationships with a biological parent, the decision represents a
present-day defeat in the war to recognize same-sex adoption in North
Carolina. First, Boseman allows same-sex couples to co-parent a child
raised by both people in terms of custody and visitation, but it bars the
non-biological parent from becoming a legal parent without the termination of parental rights by the biological parent. Secondly, the North
Carolina legislatures now do not have a pressing need to allow samesex adoption within the state because a same-sex parent may be able
to seek joint physical and legal custody under this decision. As a result, Boseman has created yet another setback for the same-sex adoption debate while at first glance appearing to be a major step forward.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 73.
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Winning the Battle: Recognition of Same-Sex Couples as Coparents

The most positive aspect of the decision in Boseman is that it legally
recognizes co-parenting in the context of a same-sex relationship or
domestic partnership. North Carolina currently does not recognize
same-sex marriage or adoption, so many couples are left without legal
recourse in their attempts to start families. As a result, many samesex couples are resorting to "parenting agreements" like the agreement found in Mason.67 Parenting agreements such as the one found
in Mason and the void adoption decree in Boseman attempt to create
a legal contract between a biological parent and their domestic partner in the absence of a state-created adoption order. The agreements
set forth several important decisions regarding custody and participation of the non-biological parent in childrearing and legal decisions
involving the child's welfare. 68 While the adoption decree in Boseman
was a legal attempt at recognition by the state of North Carolina,
which was inevitably held void, it still represented an attempt to have
both parents recognized equally as the legal parents of the child born
into the relationship.6 9 In spite of North Carolina's reluctance to recognize a proper adoption method for same-sex couples, the Boseman
Court's holding allows a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship to establish a right to remain in the child's life upon the termination of the relationship with the child's biological parent through
custody and visitation.
B.

Losing the War: Bypassing the Argument for Same-Sex
Adoption

Despite the potential right to custody and visitation under a "best
interest" analysis as provided in Boseman, non-biological parents in
same-sex relationships are still barred from establishing permanent legal parent-child relationships with children absent a termination of the
biological parent's parental rights. The Supreme Court's willingness
to award joint legal custody to a same-sex couple that has co-parented
a child during the child's lifetime provides no reason for the North
Carolina legislature to seriously consider the issue of same-sex adoption at this time. Due to the structure of North Carolina's adoption
statutes and the inability of same-sex couples to legally marry in the
state, same-sex couples will continue to face the dilemma of having
only one legal parent for any children born or adopted into their relationships. Additionally, Boseman creates no true safeguards for non67. See Id. at 60-61.
68. Id.
69. See Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 497.
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biological parents in same-sex relationships because the "best interest" analysis is not even considered until the relationship has been
terminated. Finally, Boseman continues to only promote a traditional
view of the heterosexual family unit by ultimately allowing unmarried
heterosexual couples the possibility of completing an adoption that is
not available to their homosexual counterparts.
Same-sex couples in North Carolina are unable to adopt children as
a single unit under any type of adoption within the state. The three
types of adoption, as created by the North Carolina General Assembly, would all require the termination of the biological parent's rights
before their significant other would be able to legally adopt the
child."o As a result, one-half of every same-sex couple in North Carolina will be left out of the legal parenting process since they cannot
become a legal parent without an initial termination of parental
rights." Further, a biological parent in a same-sex couple or domestic
partnership will have to face the possibility that his or her decision to
include her significant other in the life of his or her child as a second
parent could constitute conduct inconsistent with his or her paramount parental rights.7 2
Similarly, Boseman fails to offer permanent legal protection for
both parties in same-sex relationships because the custody issues do
not surface, if at all, until the termination of the relationship. Both
heterosexual and same-sex couples with children tend not to face custody and visitation issues until the parties involved in the relationship
separate or divorce. In fact, the custody disputes in Price, Mason, and
Boseman all occurred upon the separation of each couple.7 3 Coparenting tends not to present any real problems while couples are
happily involved with each other. Unfortunately for unmarried
couples, the non-biological parents are not legally recognized as parents for purposes of the United States Constitution or North Carolina
state law.74 Therefore, until the court steps in and enters a joint legal
custody award for both parties, only the biological parents will be able
to enjoy the rights to parenting the child.7 5 Likewise, while a nonbiological parent may be required to uphold financial and legal responsibilities in regards to the child for the purposes of custody (for
example, child support),7 6 the same parent will be unable to enjoy the
constitutionally protected interest in raising and caring for that same
70. N.C. GEN. STA-r. § 48-1-106(c) (2010).

71.
72.
73.
74.

See Mason, 660 S.E.2d at 70.
See Bosernan, 704 S.E.2d at 505.
See Bosernan, 704 S.E.2d at 494; Price, 484 S.E.2d at 531; Mason, 660 S.E.2d at 58.
Mason, 660 S.E.2d at 73.

75. Price, 484 S.E.2d at 531.

76. Id. at 537.
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child." This paradox seemingly creates an issue of fairness in the dissolution of a relationship between a same-sex couple who have maintained a successful co-parenting relationship up until the date of
separation. The potential for the separation of a minor child from one
of the only parents he or she has known totally flies in the face of the
North Carolina General Assembly's purpose to promote the best interests and welfare of the state's children." Hence, non-biological
parents may either be forced to remain in relationships in order to
avoid custodial conflict or risk losing their ability to effectively coparent and be allowed to make decisions along with the biological
parent.
Finally, Boseman fails to recognize a major difference between
same-sex and unmarried, heterosexual couples as it pertains to available alternatives for adoption. Unlike their same-sex counterpart, an
unmarried, heterosexual couple will have the potential opportunity to
take advantage of North Carolina's stepparent adoption statute.
Under this statute, the heterosexual couple could avoid all questions
surrounding a constitutional right to parent by marrying and obtaining
consent to the adoption from the other biological parent." Obtaining
a stepparent adoption may be a daunting task for heterosexual
couples, but it still creates the availability of constitutionally protected
parental interests in both parents involved in the relationship.so
Same-sex couples, on the other hand, are not given this luxury. In
order for same-sex couples to take advantage of a stepparent adoption, same-sex marriage would have to be legally recognized in the
state as well. Unless and until same-sex marriage legislation is passed
by the General Assembly, same-sex couples will be prohibited from
using this method of adoption.
V.

CONCLUSION

Even though Boseman appears to make strides in the recognition of
co-parenting issues and opportunities for same-sex couples, the decision and its predecessors have also stalled the same-sex adoption debate once again. The Boseman decision can be viewed as an
alternative to legalizing same-sex adoption because legal custody
would allow both parties to make important decisions about childrearing equally. However, only one party to the relationship will be able
to enjoy a constitutionally protected parental interest in any children
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
N.C.
N.C.
N.C.

GEN. STAr.
GIN. STAr.
GEN. STAr.

§ 50-13.2(a) (2010).
§ 48-4-102 (2010).
§ 48-1-106(b) (2010).
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In this respect, celebrating
born or adopted into the relationship.
the small victory found in Boseman's "best interest" analysis without
first requiring a finding of unfitness within the biological parent may
also be conceding a major defeat in the overall battle to legalize samesex adoption in North Carolina.

81.

Price, 484 S.E.2d at 79.
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